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In De Generatione et Corruptione II 9 Aristotle treats of the four causes of things gene-
rable and perishable and expounds his own doctrine of the efficient cause. He especially 
focuses on the confirmation of his theory of the necessity of the efficient cause. Within 
the frame of this theory he grasps the opportunity to set out his criticism, on the one 
hand of those who ignored the efficient cause, and on the other hand, those who wron-
gly attributed the efficient cause to other kinds of causality. My reading of this chapter is 
 * An earlier version of this paper was presented at the III International Congress of Greek Philosophy, 
Lisbon, April 20–22, 2016.
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based on Philoponus’ exegesis which contributes significantly, not only to the clarifica-
tion of Aristotle’s thinking but also to the manifestation of the arguments articulated in 
defence of the Platonic theory of Forms, which came under attack by Aristotle.
1. The method for the investigation of the four causes 
Aristotle begins this chapter with an instruction on the method we have to follow in our 
investigation in order to discover, concerning all generation alike, how many principles 
there are of it and what they are. He states that we shall in this way be able more easily to 
study particular cases, namely, when we have first obtained a grasp of the things which 
are universal.1 We can see here a reversal of the typical and proper method of natural 
science and more generally of scientific knowledge, introduced by Aristotle2 at least in 
the Physics I 1, the Posterior Analytics I 2, and the Metaphysics VII 3. In the Physics I 1, 
Aristotle suggests that the natural course is to proceed from what is clearer and more 
knowable to us, to what is more knowable and clear by nature; for the two are not the 
same. Hence, we must start thus with things which are less clear by nature, but clea-
rer to us, and move on to things which are by nature clearer and more knowable. In 
the Posterior Analytics I 2, Aristotle clarifies the distinction between what is prior and 
more knowable in relation to us and what is prior and more knowable by nature and 
explains that what is most universal is furthest away, and the particulars are nearest. In 
the Metaphysics he also describes the same course as the highly recommended method 
for the attainment of knowledge, for learning (mathēsis) proceeds for all in this way.3
However, it seems that here this method of proceeding from the universal to the 
particular does not focus on the ontological content of the terms universal and particu-
lar. Rather, it has a pure epistemological and logical value and stems only from the self-
evident assumption that what is valid in the whole realm of things generable and peri-
shable, is also valid for each particular which belongs to this realm. Philoponus justifies 
and explains Aristotle’s methodological instruction by saying that from the principles 
of comings to be in general we shall also know the principles of particular comings to 
be, because there are as many principles of particular comings to be as there are princi-
ples of comings to be in general.4 Joachim in his commentary follows an interpretation 
which shows that here the relationship between the terms katholou and kath’ hekasta 
corresponds to that between the genus and its species: “It remains for us to determine 
1  Arist. GC 335a25–28; transl. Williams (1982; repr. 2002: 52).
2  Arist. Ph. 184a10–21; APo. 71b33–72a5; Metaph. 1029b3–12.
3  I mostly follow the translation by Charlton (1970) and Barnes (1994). For this matter see also Mouzala 
(2012: 35–38). 
4  Philop. 281.9–11. In all references to the text of Philoponus’ Commentary I follow the translation by 
Kupreeva (2005).
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the number and the nature of the ῾originative sources of all coming-to-be alike ,᾿ i.e. of 
γένεσις considered as the universal of which the γενέσεις of the various types of γενητά 
are specific forms… This is the right procedure: for it is a principle of method that a῾ grasp 
of the true theory of any universal facilitates the understanding of its specific forms᾿ …”.5 
Joachim’s interpretation is compatible with Philoponus’ exegesis, since the latter uses 
the terms katholou and kata meros geneseis, which proves that in this case he construes 
katholou as a whole or as a genus and kath’ hekasta as parts or as specific cases of it.6
Aristotle begins his presentation of the four causes of all things generable and peri-
shable with the statement that the principles of things generable and perishable are as 
many in number as those of things eternal, and t῾he same in kind .᾿ For matter is posited 
in both as a subject, and form too is considered to be present in the former as well as in the 
latter.7 The celestial bodies in this passage are referred to as eternal and primary beings. 
Although being eternal, they are perceptible and in movement; it is for this reason that 
they require all the four principles or causes; the material, the formal, the efficient and the 
final. In their case the principles or causes are the same numerically and generically as the 
principles and causes of things generable and perishable, i.e. the principles of sublunary 
bodies are equal in number and identical in kind to those of celestial bodies.8
The material cause is also present in the sphere of the celestial bodies. But the latter 
are contrasted with the generable and perishable things and are superior ontologically 
to them because they are eternally actual substances and the sources of life and change 
in the sublunary sphere; this is due to the fact that they have a different and superior 
matter which is not subject to generation and destruction9. Philoponus points out that in 
generable things matter is considered as that which is potentially, as it is in potentiality 
each of the contraries, whereas in the case of things eternal it is not considered as that 
which is potentially, but is always in actuality endowed with form10. In addition, there is 
a difference between the celestial and the sublunary bodies in terms of the formal cause. 
Philoponus states that the matter of the celestial bodies does not sometimes acquire form 
and sometimes become deprived of it, because there, form is eternal and is always dispo-
5  Joachim (1922: 247).
6  Cf. also Philop. 281.7–8; in this passage he uses also the term archai katholou (principles in general).
7  See Philop. 281.11–14; Williams (1982; repr. 2002: 180) notes that Aristotle uses the word principles 
instead of the word causes and he adds that the word translated ῾kind᾿ is the word for genus, rather than species.
8  Cf. Williams (1982; repr. 2002: 180–181).
9  The celestial bodies qua perceptible and moving, involve matter as well as form; but their matter is called 
Aethēr and is itself ungenerated, indestructible and exempt from increase and alteration, i.e. eternal ; see Arist. 
Cael. 269a4–270b26; esp. 269b14–18: “…we may infer with confidence that there is something beyond the bodies 
that are about us on this earth, different and separate from them; and that the superior glory of its nature is 
proportionate to its distance from this world of ours” transl. Stocks & Wallis (1922).
10  Philop. 281.14–17; cf. 283.7–10. Since the only change to which the celestial bodies are liable is locomo-
tion, the matter of the celestial bodies is appropriate only for locomotion, so it is in potentiality only with regard 
to locomotion (hulē topikē); see Arist. Metaph. 1042b5–6; 1069b24–26 and Ps.-Alex. In Metaph. 673.27–32; 
688.22–27. 
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sed in the same way, not having a contrary, while here it is subject to coming to be and 
passing away, because contrariety is held to be in it, i.e. because it always has a contrary, 
which is privation.11
2. The necessity of the efficient cause
Aristotle, in passage 335a30–32, refers to the efficient cause as the third principle which 
must also exist, for the other two are not adequate for making things come to be any 
more than in the case of the primary beings.12 Philoponus notes that the efficient cause 
in things generable and perishable is the cause of coming to be, whereas in things eternal, 
it is the efficient cause not of coming to be but of being and permanence.13 It is obvious 
that Aristotle in this passage stresses the fact that the two principles, the material and 
formal cause, are not sufficient for making things come to be, because from now on he 
wants to use this statement as a starting point for the presentation of his theory about 
the necessity of the efficient cause. So the emphasis in this passage is not on the kind of 
change that these two principles are insufficient to cause, but on the fact that any change 
has to fulfill the requirement of a third absolutely necessary presupposition, of the third 
principle, i.e. of the efficient cause.
Philoponus raises the question as to why here Aristotle apparently says that the two 
principles are not sufficient, but what is coming to be needs also an efficient cause, since 
he himself said elsewhere that when matter is suitable for receiving form, there is no 
need of any third party which would bind form to it, but it receives it of its own nature 
and spontaneously (autophuōs kai automatōs).14 Philoponus himself contributes to the 
solution of the apparent contradiction, by replying to this that the fact that matter has 
become suitable is owed not to matter itself, but to the efficient cause. He further points 
out that it is for this reason that there is the need of efficient cause, for making the matter 
suitable to work upon, and he offers an example: “For in this way the sculptor is said to 
bring about the form, namely by removing from matter that which impedes the form, not 
by imposing the form from outside. And the matter receives the suitability and acquires 
11  Philop. 281.18–20.
12  Transl. Williams (1982; repr. 2002: 52).
13  Philop. 281.20–22. So, primary beings need also an efficient cause, albeit not for coming to be but for 
being and persistence; see Philop. 284.9–11.
14  Philop. 283.27–284.2; Philoponus probably refers to what is said in Aristotle’s Metaph. Z 9, 1034a9–26 
and Θ 8, 1049b4–10; cf. Kupreeva (2005: 141, n. 278). See also Ps.-Alex. In Metaph. 500.37–501.10 and 521.7–8.
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the form at the same time”.15 Kupreeva16 notes that Philoponus’ words, “for making the 
matter suitable to work upon”, suggest “that working on matter is distinct from making 
matter suitable to work on (although both may be functions of efficient cause)”, but the 
example given by Philoponus “seems to fuse these two functions, or at least to be making 
a transition from one to another continuous without gaps”. I believe that there are two 
different functions of the efficient cause, but that there is not a time difference between 
them. As soon as the efficient cause removes from matter that which impedes the recep-
tion of form, it at once imposes the form. This is due also to the fact that the efficient cause 
does not impose the form from without. So, the efficient cause implements two different 
functions which do not have a distance or gap in time between them, because the form is 
imposed by the efficient cause timelessly. This is why the transition from one to another 
seems to be continuous, as Kupreeva notes. In fact only the removal of the impediment 
by the efficient cause can be measured by the time and it is a change in the proper sense.17
In passage 335a32–b6, Aristotle describes the ontological status of the matter, i.e. of 
the underlying substrate of things generable and perishable. Matter is the being in poten-
tiality, which can sometimes be and at other times not be, so is capable of both being and 
not being this particular form. This also explains why the efficient cause is necessary 
in order for a change to be realized. The efficient cause acts properly so as to make the 
matter suitable for receiving this particular form. 
15  Philop. 284.2–7. In chapter H 6 of his Metaphysics, Aristotle examines how can we justify the unity of the 
definition; since a definition is a unity because what it is a definition of is a unity, as Bostock notes, the problem 
of the unity of definition is reduced to the problem of the unity of the definiendum; the unity of substance, i.e. 
the unity of matter and form, according to Aristotle, provides a solution to the problem of the unity of the 
definition and to the much wider problem of the unity of predication; see Bostock (1994: 279, 288–289). In 
passage Metaph. 1045a30–33, Aristotle raises the following rhetorical question: “What, then, causes this-that 
which was potentially to be actually-except, in the case of things which are generated, the agent?” (transl. Ross, 
The Internet Classics Archive). In this phrase it is clear that Aristotle considers the efficient cause as the cause 
which makes what is potential, i.e. matter, receive the form and become actual. In the second phrase of the same 
passage Aristotle uses an example which implies another cause of the union of matter and form: “For there is 
no other cause of the potential sphere’s becoming actually a sphere, but this was the essence of either” (transl. 
Ross, The Internet Classics Archive). This statement means that matter and form have by nature the capacity to 
be one because it is the essence of either, i.e. the essence of matter on the one hand and the essence of form on 
the other, to become one and to coexist in a unity. For the different readings of this passage see Mouzala (2008: 
86–95). So, in Metaph. 1045a30–33 we can see both the causes referred to by Philoponus, i.e. the efficient cause 
as well as the innate capacity of matter to receive the form, as causes of the transition from the potential to the 
actual. In a previous work I have maintained that in Metaph. H 6 when Aristotle refers to the sensible particulars, 
i.e. to the things which are generated, he justifies the unity of the potential and the actual being by the efficient 
cause. But when he refers to matter and form as principles which are not subject to generation, destruction and 
alteration, he justifies their unity by invoking the essence of matter and form, which reflects the inner timeless 
and unalterable nature of either (see esp. Mouzala 2008:93).
16  Kupreeva (2005: 141, n. 279).
17  The function according to which the efficient cause imposes the form upon matter is not measured by 
the time, so it is not a change in the proper sense. The point that neither matter nor form come to be or come to 
the existence or have genesis is made in Metaph. Ζ 8, 1033a24–b19; see also Ps.-Alex. In Metaph. 494.26–495.23; 
496.9–11.
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In the rest of the chapter Aristotle divides all preceding theories into two groups: 
i) theories which tried to explain generation and corruption by the formal cause ii) 
theories which tried to explain generation and corruption by the material cause or the 
instrumental causes.18 Aristotle sets out his arguments against both types of theory and 
correspondingly proves the inadequacy of both the material and the formal cause for the 
explanation of all natural changes. The emphasis he gives to the need for the investigation 
and identification of the efficient cause is due to the fact that all recognized the material 
and the formal, but as to the efficient cause, every philosopher dreamed of it, but no 
one articulated it.19 Aristotle reproaches the other philosophers for adducing no proper 
notion of the efficient cause. According to Philoponus, in passage 335b7–8 he alludes 
to both Anaxagoras and Plato; for Anaxagoras, having declared the Intellect to be the 
efficient cause, makes no use of it in his account of the coming to be of things, and Plato, 
too, mentioned the efficient cause in the Timaeus but in the Phaedo attached the efficient 
cause to the Forms20. Joachim21 believes that there does not seem to be any evidence to 
determine to what theories, besides that of ῾Socrates in the Phaedo ,᾿ Aristotle is here 
referring.
3. Criticism of the theories which adduced no proper notion of the efficient 
cause
Socrates’ treatment of Anaxagoras’ theory about Nous as a cause of generation and 
destruction constitutes an apparently parenthetical discussion within the frame of the 
autobiographical digression in the Phaedo. This discussion interferes between Socrates’ 
criticism of previous attempts by other philosophers to provide explanations of gene-
ration and destruction and his decision to set out a second sailing in quest of the real 
cause. Although I do not agree with Lennox that there is a radical discontinuity betwe-
en the Anaxagorean excursus and the rest of the exploration of the cause of generation 
and destruction, I do agree with him that this intrusion is intentional and completely 
self-conscious, while at the same time there is no obvious shift in the motivation.22 The 
question has not been changed within the passage where Anaxagoras’ theory is discussed. 
Nevertheless, Plato offers through Socrates’ mouth another type of explanation of the 
efficient cause, which is teleological in nature. As Fine notes, Nous ordering all things is 
18  Cf. Joachim (1922: 248). 
19  Arist. GC 335b7–8; see also Philop. 281.23–25.
20  Philop. 285.10–14; it is obvious that Philoponus refers to the Demiurge; see Pl. Ti. 27d–29b; Philop. In 
Phys. 241.27–30; Theophr. apud Simpl. In Phys. 26.7–13; Alex. apud Simpl. In Phys. 26.13–18. See also Pl. Phd. 
100c–101d.
21  Joachim (1922: 249).
22  Cf. Lennox (1985: 197–200).
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an efficient cause, while its ordering all things for the best is the teleological constituent 
of that cause23. But it seems indisputable that Anaxagoras’ theory proposes Nous as the 
efficient cause of every ordering and arrangement in the cosmos. 
If Philoponus’ suggestion that Aristotle here alludes also to Anaxagoras is correct, 
one could ask why Aristotle reproaches Anaxagoras for adducing no proper notion 
of the efficient cause. Philoponus explains twice24 the answer to that question; but he 
would be expected to have explained it from Aristotle’s perspective. In the first passage 
he states that Plato after reproaching others for adducing no notion of the efficient cause 
he commended Anaxagoras for saying that the intellect is efficient cause, although not 
even he used it in the coming to be of things generable. In the second passage Philoponus 
justifies in the same way Aristotle’s criticism of Anaxagoras’ theory. Anaxagoras, he says, 
having declared the Intellect to be the efficient cause, makes no use of it in his account of 
the coming to be of things. In this way it seems that Philoponus attributes to Aristotle’s 
criticism of Anaxagoras’ theory, the same reasons as those of Plato’s criticism of it. In 
fact, in his comment on passage 335b7–8, Philoponus summarizes very briefly Plato’s 
account of Anaxagoras’ theory in the Phaedo, but without even giving the specific aim 
or the specific meaning of Plato’s criticism of it.25 So we can reach the conclusion that 
Philoponus’ suggestion that Aristotle’s criticism here is directed also against Anaxago-
ras cannot be confirmed by internal textual evidence. But even if we sustain this claim, 
it is disputable whether Aristotle and Plato criticized Anaxagoras for the same reasons.26
23  Fine (2003: 373).
24  Philop. 281.27–29; 285.10–12; cf. Damasc. In Phd. 412.1–4; Damascius, in his comment on the Phaedo 
97b8–98c2, also notes that Plato’s criticism of Anaxagoras’ view is due to the fact that, though he had a glimpse of 
the efficient cause, did not make use of it; he explains that in his account of the facts, according to Plato’s view, he 
puts forth the irrational, i.e. indefinite causes, which will take opposite directions by what appears to be a sudden 
change of mind. Westerink (2009: p. 221, note on Damascius 412.3–4) clarifies that this change of mind is not 
attributed to Anaxagoras but to the irrational causes (alogistous aitias) which take opposite directions, i.e. to the 
lower causes subject to contrary impulses; Westerink also invites us to confer with the above passage Damascius 
414.2–3, where the commentator states that the contributory causes (sunaitia) tend in opposite directions and 
subserve contrary opinions, like a blind man. So, according to Damascius’ exegesis, the point of Plato’s criticism 
of Anaxagoras is that he fuses a proper said efficient cause, as it is Nous, which is a true cause, with the contribu-
tory causes, which are irrational and indefinite causes. 
25  Socrates states, similarly to what Philoponus says, that Anaxagoras made no use of intelligence and did 
not assign any real causes for the ordering of things. But the crucial point of Plato’s criticism of Anaxagoras 
which is not mentioned by Philoponus is that his explanation of the natural coming to be and perishing is strictly 
mechanical and does not lay emphasis on the teleological dimension of the causal explanation, which according 
to Socrates is absolutely necessary even if the cause is originally an efficient cause; see Phaedo 97b–99d. We can 
find more explicit remarks on the connection between the efficient and final cause in this passage of the Phaedo 
in the ancient exegetical tradition; Damascius (In Phd. 413.1–6; 415.1–2; 416.7–8) states that Socrates links the 
efficient cause, when this is considered as the intelligence, directly with the final cause, and cannot view intel-
ligence apart from finality. In fact Anaxagoras is blamed by Socrates, as Annas (1982: 315) correctly notes, for 
ignoring goodness in his cosmological explanations, although the desired teleology is not the kind of narrow 
teleology which explains only natural processes, but human action as well as natural phenomena. For a discus-
sion whether Plato’s explanation of human action in the Phaedo is included in the causal explanation provided 
by the Forms see Taylor (1969: 46–47).
26  We must take into consideration that Anaxagoras rules out the possibility of coming to be or passing away 
and explains apparent generation and destruction through mixture and separation or dissociation (DK 59 B 17). 
130 Melina G. Mouzala  / Patras /
4. Criticism of the Platonic theory of the Forms as Causes
Aristotle criticizes Plato as a representative of those philosophers who rendered the Form 
as efficient cause. In passage 335b9–10 he states: “Some thought that the nature of the 
Forms is an adequate cause for coming to be. And this is the view of Socrates in the 
Phaedo”.27 He then gives us a very useful explanation of what Socrates says in passage 
99d–101d of the Phaedo.28 It is not true that Aristotle is here just paraphrasing the Phaedo 
as Joachim asserts.29 In fact, Aristotle construes generation and destruction in terms of 
attaining and losing participation in the Forms, and this is a considerable contribution to 
our understanding of the Platonic passage. In this way he implies what Damascius expli-
citly says in his Commentary on the Phaedo, namely that Form is present in the particu-
lars, but only by participation, and that there is communion, but only in the sense that 
sensible particulars communicate in Forms, not both in a third reality, and they commu-
nicate only in the way of participation.30 However, it is precisely on this interpretation that 
Aristotle focuses his criticism of Plato’s theory of Forms as causes.
In De Generatione et Corruptione II 9, there is an implicit and an explicit criticism of 
the Platonic Forms as causes. In fact these two aspects of Aristotle’s criticism are substan-
tially interrelated. Aristotle’s explicit criticism is expounded in passage 335b18–24, but his 
implicit criticism of the Platonic Forms as efficient causes is relevant to this interpretation 
of the Platonic explanation of coming to be and perishing, offered by Aristotle in passa-
ge 335b12–16. What we can infer from this passage and from 335b 9–10, is that Aristotle 
focuses his criticism of Plato’s account of the causes in the Phaedo on the nature of the 
But he introduces the Intellect as the efficient cause of the original rotation, i.e. the rotary motion imparted by 
Nous, which causes the separation of the ingredients in the mixture (DK 59 B 12, B 13). Nous is the first principle 
of motion, and consequently it would be plausible to think that Aristotle criticizes Anaxagoras for being unable 
to give the proximate efficient cause of things that come to be, although he recognizes that Anaxagoras’ Intel-
lect, unlike the Platonic Ideas, is actuality; see Arist. Metaph. Λ 6, 1072a4–6. According to Philoponus, Aristotle 
criticizes Plato for the same reason, i.e. for being unable to give the proximate efficient cause of generable and 
perishable things; Philop. 285.19–20. Aristotle attaches great importance to the proximate efficient cause. In the 
Metaphysics Λ 5, 1071a33–b2 he refers to the principles and causes and elements of all substances (οὐσίαι); he 
mentions as causes of substances, which are common to all things, matter, form, privation and the moving or 
the efficient cause. Ps.-Alexander, in his comment on the passage Metaph. Λ 5, 1071a35–36, interprets the “first 
cause in respect of complete reality” (τὸ πρῶτον ἐντελεχείᾳ; transl. Ross: The Internet Classics Archive) as the 
first proximate efficient cause. He seems to evaluate it as the primary cause in comparison with that which is 
further away (πορρώτερον); see Ps.-Alex. In Metaph. 685.11–14.
27  Transl. Williams (1982; repr. 2002). See also Philop. 281.25–26.
28  Aristotle says: “And this is the view of Socrates in the Phaedo. He, after blaming everyone else for saying 
nothing to the point, adopts the hypothesis that, of things that are, some are forms and some partake of the 
forms, and that everything is said to be in virtue of the form, to come to be in virtue of receiving a share of it and 
to perish in virtue of losing it; so if this is true, the forms, he thinks, are necessarily the causes of both generation 
and corruption”, transl. Williams (1982; repr. 2002).
29  Joachim (1922: 249).
30  See Damasc., In Phd. 418.5–6. Philoponus (285.26–286.1) supports this interpretation. According to him, 
Aristotle says that each thing has its being in accordance with Forms, and the fact of its having come to be in 
accordance with its participation of them, just as its perishing is in accordance with its loss of them.
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Platonic Forms, which prevents them from being an adequate cause for coming to be and 
perishing. It is because of their nature that they are not sufficient for production. Against 
Plato’s claim that Form by its presence produces that which participates in it and is endo-
wed with Form, while loss of participation causes it to perish, Aristotle could raise the 
objection that in this way, Form does not act like a real efficient cause, so it does not prove 
to be such. As pointed out by G. Fine, by assigning the preeminent role to participation 
of the sensible things in Forms, Plato leads us to reach the conclusion that Forms are not 
themselves strictly speaking the aitiai (causes), but are only constituents of these aitiai 
since they are only the salient factors in change.31
I think the point of Aristotle’s implicit criticism of the Platonic Forms as causes in 
this chapter is the following; since generation and corruption of the sensibles depen-
ds on the participation of the Forms and loss of participation and the presence of the 
Forms in the sensibles or the communion of the latter with the Forms are realized only by 
way of participation, we can reach the conclusion that Forms are not at all active during 
this procedure. In consequence they are not at all active causes, namely efficient causes, 
because from the Aristotelian perspective this kind of cause must not only be actually 
existing, but also actually operating or acting32. Rather, coming to be and perishing of 
the particulars is an effect of their participation and loss of participation in the Forms. 
According to what is stated in De Generatione et Corruptione I 7, 324a24–b14, the term to 
kinoun (the mover) and the corresponding term to poioun (the producer) have a double 
significance and application. They apply to that which contains the originative source of 
the movement, i.e. the first in the series of causes of a movement, and also to “that which 
is last” (to eschaton) in the series of causes; namely to the cause next to the body which is 
being moved and to that which is coming to be. The mover in the sense of eschaton (“that 
which is last”), while moving and acting upon a subject, is always moved by that which 
it moves or is always altered by that on which it acts.33 So the proximate efficient cause in 
31  Fine (2003: 385): “Participating in a form is a state of affairs that includes a form as a constituent; coming 
to participate in a form is an event that includes a form as a constituent. But it is such states of affairs and events 
that are the aitiai, not forms all by themselves.”
32  Cf. Berti (2000: 194). According to what is said in the Physics 194b29–32, the efficient cause is something 
which initiates the process of the change or its cessation when the process is completed… or more generally the 
prime, conscious or unconscious, agent that produces the effect and starts the material on its way to the product, 
changing it from what it was to what it is to be (transl. Wicksteed & Cornford: 1957). Simplicius, in his comment 
on this passage of Aristotle’s Physics, states that the efficient cause is the producer which is called by Aristotle, 
“that from which (othen) change and its cessation initiated”; see Simpl. In Phys. 315.9–10 (transl. my own).
33  Cf. Joachim (1922: 153). Aristotle repeatedly states that the cause of motion must be in contact with what 
it moves; see Arist. Ph. 202a6–9; 258a18–21; 266b28–267a20; GC 322b21–25; 323a20–34; cf. Sorabji (1988: 220). 
Since the mover (to kinoun) is not only actually this thing here (energeia tode ti) but also potentially something 
else (dynamei allo), while the mover is in contact with the moved, that which exists in potentiality within the 
mover, must be acted on by that which exists in actuality within the moved; see also Mouzala (2003: 123–127, 
153). As Berti (2000: 186) correctly stresses, the word which designates the efficient cause, the word ποιητικόν 
(as well as the parallel word κινητικόν), has the specific suffix -τικόν, which indicates the capacity to do something. 
Berti points out that the Aristotelian terms ἐνεργοῦν and ἐνεργεῖν denote that the active capacity of the efficient 
cause is actually in exercise; the use of those terms by Aristotle seems to indicate not only that the ontological 
condition of the efficient cause is an actuality, i.e. a fully accomplished condition, but also that this is accompa-
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Aristotle’s causal theory is that which by directly acting upon a subject brings about its 
motion, change, generation or destruction. Consequently, as Philoponus correctly notes, 
from Aristotle’s perspective Plato turned out to be unable to give the proximate efficient 
cause of things that come to be,but has had recourse to the Ideas.34
In passage 1071b14–17 of book Lambda of his Metaphysics, Aristotle also criticizes 
the Platonic Forms as insufficient to be efficient causes. Aristotle formulates his criticism 
of the Platonic Forms as follows: “Nothing, then, is gained even if we suppose eternal 
substances, as the believers in the Forms do, unless there is to be in them some principle 
which can cause change; nay, even this is not enough, nor is another substance besides 
the Forms enough; for if it does not act, there will be no movement”.35 Aristotle insists in 
this passage that the Platonic Forms, although being eternal themselves, are not adequate 
and sufficient to explain why eternal beings and eternal movement of the heaven exist as 
they are. According to him it would be useless to sup-pose, i.e. to make to underlie, eter-
nal substances as the Platonists do, since the Forms do not contain any principle which 
can cause change. Furthermore, it would also be useless to suppose another substance 
besides the Forms, if this is not actually acting, i.e. if it does not have any activity.36 Pseu-
do-Alexander verifies in his Commentary that the believers of the Forms declared that 
the Forms are immovable and not at all acting.37 Berti correctly stresses that even if Plato 
considered the Forms as efficient causes Aristotle denied this character to them, because 
they are not acting, i.e. because they have no activity; he also notes that from the point 
of view of the Aristotelian ontological distinction between potentiality and actuality the 
Platonic Forms would be actualities, but they must not be considered as efficient causes, 
because they lack activity.38
nied by a true activity. For the difference in meaning between the terms kinētikon and kinoun see Ph. 202a16–17; 
Mouzala (2003: 158, n. 291). 
34  Philop. 285.19–21.
35  For the translation see Berti (2000: 188).
36  Cf. Berti (2000: 188).
37  See Ps.-Alex. In Metaph. 688.27–689.1 (esp. 688.35–38). Cf. Arist. Metaph. Α 7, 988b1–4, where Aristotle 
states that for the Platonists the Forms are causes of immobility and of being at rest rather than of movement; 
also in Metaph. Α 9, 991a8–11 he states that they cause neither movement nor any change.
38  Berti (2000: 189) reaches the conclusion that the cause of the eternal movement of the heaven which is 
considered as a proper said efficient cause must be not only actuality, but also activity. But, in my view, there is 
a need to emphasize that in the case of the prime unmoved mover, this activity is in no way a kind of motion in 
the Aristotelian sense; Simplicius in his Commentary on the Physics states (In Phys. 317.14–17): “Being the prin-
ciple of change in the strict sense means being an unchanged changer, so that the efficient cause in the strictest 
sense of things that come-to-be would be that which is unchanged, eternal and always remaining enduringly the 
same. Such is august intellect”, transl. Fleet (1997). Also, according to Simplicius’ testimony (In Phys. 317.27–28), 
Alexander cleverly remarks: “…the efficient cause in the strict sense must be separate and distinct”, transl. Fleet 
(1997). Since the efficient cause in the strict sense is separate (chōriston), i.e. completely immaterial, is not subject 
to any kind of change or movement. This is ensured because it does not cause movement in a natural way, i.e. by 
approaching what comes-to-be and passes away directly, but only through everlasting intermediaries; see Simpl. 
In Phys. 317.20–23 (transl. Fleet 1997). 
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Aristotle’s explicit criticism of the Platonic Forms as causes is formulated in passage 
335b18–24 and consists of the following two arguments:39 a) If the Forms are causes, why 
they do not always generate things continuously rather than sometimes doing so and 
sometimes not, since both the Forms and the things which partake in them are always 
there? (transl. Williams). b) Furthermore, in some cases we observe something else being 
the cause: it is the doctor who induces health and the knowledgeable man knowledge, 
despite the existence of both health itself and knowledge and those who partake in it; 
and it is the same in all the other cases where something is performed in virtue of a capa-
city (transl. Williams). The first argument can be summarized as follows: “the Forms 
and the Participants always are but γένεσις is intermittent”.40 In the second argument 
Aristotle refers to the field of the products of art and obviously implies that we must draw 
an analogy between the products of art and the products of nature. In the case of the 
products of art we actually see that there is always the need for a third cause; for exam-
ple, besides Forms, such as health and knowledge, and the things which partake in them, 
e.g. people, there is always the need for a third sort of cause, exemplified by doctors and 
professors who act as efficient causes. Similarly in the case of the products of nature there 
is the need for a cause other than the Forms, which can act as a real, i.e. a proximate, effi-
cient cause. It is obvious that the sort of capacity to which Aristotle refers in 335b23–24 
is a technical skill,41 as the word prattomenōn (GC 335b 24) indicates, but in the realm 
of nature there is an analogous capacity which Philoponus has explained in detail in his 
comment on passage 335a31. In the realm of nature the fact that matter has become suita-
ble for receiving the form is owed to the efficient cause, and it is for this reason that there 
is always the need of the efficient cause, for making the matter suitable to work upon.42
G. Fine presents the articulation of Aristotle’s argument and places emphasis on the 
premise that Forms are the sole aitiai of coming and ceasing to be. She states that althou-
gh there is nothing in the text to indicate the attribute “sole”, if it is not supplied the 
Aristotelian argument collapses.43 I agree that the premise which holds that Forms are 
39  Joachim (1922: 249) recognizes two arguments, whereas Williams (1982; repr. 2002: 183) summarizes 
what Aristotle says in one argument.
40  Joachim (1922: 249). Cherniss (1944: 380) remarks that, according to Aristotle, while the theory of Ideas 
cannot explain the intermittence of generation and destruction, it is equally incapable of accounting for the 
perpetuity of movement and process which for him constitutes the eternity of the world, because for the chan-
ge that is without beginning or end there must be a cause which not only can or does act but of which actuality 
is the essence. So, as Cherniss correctly notes, Aristotle evaluates even the account of the materialists as more 
scientific than Plato’s theory of Ideas, since they recognize that movement is required for the achievement of 
generation and that “the cause of generation is a motive agent even though they mistakenly ascribe this motive 
power to matter itself ”; see Arist. GC 335b24–31. 
41  Cf. Williams (1982; repr. 2002: 184).
42  See again Philop. 283.27–284.7.
43  Fine (2003: 361, and n. 20). J.M. Watson (1909: 58) remarks that it might be retorted to Aristotle by the 
Platonists that their master had never said the Ideas could supply an ἀρχὴ (κινήσεως) γενέσεως, since in all 
Plato’s later writings, at all events, the efficient cause is soul, mind, creator; cf. Annas (1982: 312). But Watson 
asserts that as against the Phaedo, where the Ideas are made the sole efficient causes, Aristotle’s argument is valid.
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the sole aitiai, is crucial and at least reflects what Plato says in passage 100d of the Phae-
do about the communion or participation in Forms as the safest answer to the problem 
of the causes of generation and destruction.44 According to Fine45, Aristotle’s argument 
in De Generatione et Corruptione II 9 assumes, as the relative argument of Metaphysics 
I 9 (991b3–9) does not, that the existence of Forms for Plato is both a necessary and 
a sufficient condition for change. Furthermore, Fine adds that if Forms are the sole aitiai 
of change, they are efficient causes, since for Aristotle the existence of efficient causes 
is a necessary condition for change. But according to this interpretation, it is disputa-
ble whether Aristotle believes that Plato agrees with this assumption. Fine claims that, 
“Aristotle’s suggestion is not that Plato mistakenly furnished Forms as efficient causes; it 
is rather that Plato ignored efficient causes in his accounts of change, i.e. did not see that 
the existence of efficient causes is a necessary condition for change”.46
On the contrary, J. Annas has claimed that in both passages, Metaphysics I 9 (991b3–
9) and De Generatione et Corruptione II 9 (335b7–16 and 18–24), Aristotle is saying that in 
the Phaedo Forms are put forward by Plato to be what are in Aristotle’s terms “efficient 
causes”, sources of change or movement. But she evaluates Aristotle’s criticism negatively, 
with the justification that Forms are not intended by Plato to have the role of Aristote-
lian efficient causes in the first place.47 She notes that Aristotle has often been berated for 
a misunderstanding of Plato’s theory of Forms as causes in the Phaedo.48 In my opinion, 
we must take into consideration that Plato puts forward the Forms as causes of coming to 
be and perishing, because the initial question which is expressed in passage 95e–96a of 
the Phaedo, has not been changed when Socrates begins his second sailing. The subject 
of the investigation remains the same when the theory of Forms is presented as a hypo-
thesis which offers the solution to the original problem.49 In my view, this means that 
the Platonic Forms are intended to be what are in Aristotle’s terms efficient causes. But 
they are not the Aristotelian efficient causes, because they are not active. According to 
44  Plato means the safest among others which are all rejected as unsafe or at least less safe. So the uniqueness 
of this answer is indisputable; cf. also Phd. 101c.
45  Fine (2003: 361–362).
46  Fine (2003: 362).
47  Annas (1982: 311, 323). Cherniss (1944: 451–452 and n. 397) believes that, “in spite of what some modern 
interpreters have maintained, the ideas themselves are never made productive agents either as »animate beings« 
or as »active forces« of any kind”. Hackforth (1972: 145) notes that it is not clear whether Aristotle in GC is 
imputing to ῾Socrates in the Phaedo᾿ an explanation of what he himself calls γένεσις ἁπλῆ, i.e. the coming to be 
of a substance, or of what he calls τὶς γένεσις, i.e. the coming to be of an attribute. According to him the instan-
ces in 335b21–22, health and science, are for Aristotle τινὲς γενέσεις κατὰ τέχνην, but in passage 335b13–15 he 
seems to refer to the coming to be of substances. I agree that in the second passage Aristotle refers to substances 
because in 335b13 he uses the word hekaston. In any case Hackforth thinks that there is no dispute about what 
his criticism is; the Forms cannot play the part of ῾efficient᾿ or ῾moving᾿ causes.
48  See Annas (1982: 312, and n. 3); Vlastos (1973: 88–89).
49  Cf. Annas (1982: 318); she stresses that Plato sees himself as concerned throughout with a single topic: 
aitia or explanation; she also adds (Annas 1982: 324) that there are no indications at all that Socrates is aware 
of changing the subject.
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the Aristotelian view of the efficient cause, the agent of change is active in producing the 
change exactly for as long as the patient is passive in suffering it and the former transfers 
its form with regard to a characteristic to the latter.50
The whole frame of the Platonic causes is totally different from that of the Aristote-
lian causes. Nevertheless, since Socrates in the Phaedo seeks to find the causes of gene-
ration and destruction, it is plausible to say that even from the Aristotelian point of view 
he furnishes the Forms as efficient causes. In Metaphysics I 6, 988a8–10, Aristotle states 
that Plato used only two Aristotelian causes, the formal and the material. I agree with 
Annas that there is only an apparent contradiction between this passage and the other 
two, namely Metaphysics I 9, 991b3–9 and De Generatione et Corruptione II 9, 335b9–16, 
where Aristotle asserts that the Platonic causes are meant to be efficient causes.51 In De 
Generatione et Corruptione, Aristotle reproaches Plato for thinking that the nature of the 
Forms is an adequate cause for coming to be. It is also obvious from Philoponus’ explana-
tion52 that Aristotle in fact blames Plato for furnishing as efficient causes what from the 
Aristotelian point of view are formal causes. But we must not forget that Plato’s intention 
is to display the causes of generation and destruction. 
The crucial difference between Plato and Aristotle is that the former does not have 
in mind the Aristotelian fourfold scheme of explanations or causes when he presents his 
theory of Forms. Conversely, Aristotle has his own theory of causes as a starting point for 
his criticism, which of course stems not only from Plato’s but also from all the predeces-
sors’ theories on causation. Consequently, Aristotle believes, as Annas correctly notes,53 
that Plato is confusedly treating together very different kinds of explanation, which 
according to him are mutually irreducible. Moreover, although Aristotle believes that 
efficient, formal and final aitiai can come together since they are concurrent,54 he also 
50  Cf. Annas (1982: 319–320).
51  Annas (1982: 312). Watson (1909: 59–60) notes that from the Platonic dialogues themselves does not 
result the impression that Plato recognizes only two causes, the formal and the material. He remarks that in the 
statement at least of universal efficient cause, no one could be more emphatic than Plato; he mentions Sophist, 
Timaeus, Philebus, Laws as being in this respect alike. He adds that similarly, as to final cause, one should take 
into consideration the description of the Ideas as Archetypes (παραδείγματα) and of the Idea of the Good in the 
Republic as not merely highest efficient but also final cause of the universe; see also Phd. 99c; Phlb. 20d, 28d–29a. 
Watson (1909: 61–62) remarks that Aristotle does not wholly deny Plato’s recognition of final and efficient 
causes. As to the former, according to Watson, Aristotle says that in a sense it was postulated by Plato, only not 
qua final; the Aristotelian account of the Platonic final cause, according to this interpretation, is that Plato iden-
tifies it with the formal cause, and it is only an ῾accident᾿ of the formal cause that it happens at the same time 
to be good; so the Ideas are κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς final causes (cf. Cherniss 1944: 381). Watson notes that as to the 
efficient cause, Plato wished indeed to make his Ideas efficient powers, but seeing that they do not fulfill his own 
criteria, Aristotle denies to Plato’s system the recognition of any efficient cause. He points out that according to 
Aristotle (Metaph. A 7, 988a34–b1) even Plato’s formal cause is not quite the same as his own. He also assumes 
that Aristotle refuses to recognize Plato’s ῾maker and father of the universe᾿ as any scientific explanation.
52  See again Philop. 281.25–31.
53  Annas (1982: 325). 
54  See Arist. Ph. II 7; see also Annas (1982: 321, and n. 31). Watson (1909: 59) remarks that, “it is not doubt 
surprising to find that notwithstanding his attack on Plato, Aristotle himself reduces his four causes to two, and 
on the principle of always finding the ῾ultimate ground᾿ should trace back the efficient cause to the formal. But 
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believes in principle that the question why something is as it is, i.e. the question dia ti, 
which is the same as in Plato,55 can be answered in four different ways, not reducible to 
one another and all indispensable in terms of a total and complete explanation of each 
thing. I disagree with Annas’ view that Socrates is going some way to distinguishing, in 
Aristotle’s terms, between formal and final explanation, by offering Forms as a second 
best to offering teleological explanation.56 I do not mean by this that Plato confuses these 
two kinds of explanation; but rather that by offering Forms as the radical solution to 
the problem of the causes of generation and destruction, he chooses to furnish a type 
of causality which conflates and condenses all three kinds of the requested explanation, 
the efficient, the final, and the formal. The only cause which is not sought is the material, 
which predominates in the explanations provided by the materialistic and mechanical 
accounts of other philosophers, as described by Socrates in his autobiography.
Vlastos has rejected the idea that the Forms constitute a final cause and has claimed 
that in the Phaedo, as in the Timaeus, the teleological function is a task which pertains 
exclusively to mind (Nous) or soul.57 Was then the discussion of Anaxagoras’ theory and 
Socrates’ criticism of it a teleological parenthesis which reached its end as soon as Socra-
tes started to narrate his second sailing? Lennox58 believes that neither is the Anaxagore-
an excursus without significance to the rest of the dialogue, nor does the deuteros plous 
imply, hidden away, some sort of teleological explanations, since Nous, which is an orde-
ring cause and chooses a certain order because it is best, is absent from the treatment of 
the safe and simple explanation. The latter position explains something’s coming to be 
and perishing by participation in the Form and loss of it. Damascius, whom we can take 
as representative of the way in which the Neoplatonic tradition approaches this problem, 
though the efficient cause of a house to Aristotle is ultimately the form of the house in the mind of the builder, 
still he does not absorb the efficient cause in the formal; he recognizes the efficiency of the art of building or of 
the builder”.
55  See Pl. Phd. 96a–b.
56  Annas (1982: 324).
57  Vlastos (1973: 87–88). Ross (1924, vol. I: 176–177), in his comment on Arist. Metaph. 988a9, remarks 
that Aristotle ignores various suggestions of an efficient cause in Plato – the self-moving soul of Phdr. 245c–d, 
Lg. 891–899, the demiurge of Sph. 265b–d and of Ti. 28c ff., the αἰτία τῆς μίξεως of Phlb. 23d, 26e–27b, and 
various suggestions of a final cause – the ultimate good or οὗ χάριν of Phlb. 20d, 53e, the object of the creator’s 
purpose in Ti. 29d ff., and in Lg. 903c. According to Ross, he doubtless thinks Plato’s treatment of these causes 
inadequate, but that does not justify him in speaking as if Plato had ignored them entirely. In his comment on 
Arist. Metaph. 988b11–14, Ross (1924, vol. I: 179) adds that Aristotle ignores the distinctly teleological view 
which Plato expresses in some dialogues. H. Cherniss (1944: 451) notes that the criticism of Anaxagoras in the 
Phaedo (97c–99d) implies that Plato even then believed soul to be the true cause of all motion, and the fact that 
he calls the method there used a δεύτερος πλοῦς ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς αἰτίας ζήτησιν indicates that he already had in mind 
the account of causality given in the Timaeus; he adds that, “at any rate, whether or not Plato when he wrote 
the Phaedo had clearly integrated the causality of the ideas and that of the soul, the two are certainly not incon-
gruous and were never considered by him to be other than complementary factors in the full account”. I believe 
Cherniss’ view is very important for a coherent understanding of the Platonic theory of causality, since not only 
does it ascribe a kind of final causality to the Forms in the Phaedo, but it also sets out to combine the accounts of 
the final causality in the Phaedo with those in the Timaeus.
58  Lennox (1985: 201–202). 
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has shown that once exemplary causes are posited in the Phaedo, the efficient cause is 
somehow comprehended in them, since things here below are what they are by partici-
pation in the prototypes, and so is the final cause.59 Following Damascius, I believe that 
the close connection of the Platonic Forms with the final cause is enclosed in their para-
digmatic causal dimension. As prototypes they represent the truest and perfect version of 
each sensible and consequently they explain why participation in them and imitation of 
them brings about each thing’s being. Also being is equal to the best for each thing, and 
further being as it is, is equal to the best for each thing. So, D. Sedley is absolutely correct 
when he states that teleological causation, “is, in short, a special application of the formal 
causation to which Socrates turns in his famous ῾Second Voyage᾿ (Phd. 99c–102a), with 
its s῾afe᾿ causal story that it is the F which causes F things to be F”.60
Vlastos has pointed out that in the Platonic theory of Forms, causation seems to be 
connected with participation or communion in Forms rather than with Forms themsel-
ves. From this point of view, the real cause of coming to be and perishing is participation 
and loss of participation in the Form and not the Form itself; although Vlastos underlines 
that Plato uses the same vocabulary which he would have also used if he were speaking 
of the relation of a cause to its effect.61 Annas reaches the conclusion that Plato’s theory 
is not only non-teleological, but is also not a causal explanation, because what is being 
explained, is why a thing has a quality F. According to Annas, the Form explains this 
with no reference to any particular processes or events of things’ coming or ceasing to 
be F. Instead of talking about cases of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be, Plato is talking 
“about the possession of qualities by things, with no reference to their causal history”. 
Annas notes that Plato continues to use the language of coming-to-be, but although in 
passage 101c3–7 we are told that Forms explain not only things’ being, but also their 
becoming, they do not offer this kind of explanation. She states that what they explain is 
the possession of a quality, not the causal history of how that quality came to be posses-
sed.62 To this argument, G. Fine adds another; since coming and ceasing to participate in 
a Form involves more than the Form itself, the conclusion that Forms are the sole aitiai 
of coming and ceasing to be does not follow.63
The counter-argument to the previous ones would be that Plato uses and presents 
participation in Forms and loss of participation as cause of generation and destruction, 
in order to emphasize that particulars come to be only in so far as they communicate 
in Forms, and not vice-versa. So there is communion between particulars and Forms, 
but only by participation of the former in the latter. This also means that Plato’s inten-
tion is to show, on the one hand that the particulars must be oriented towards Forms if 
59  Damasc. In Phd. 417.1–2.
60  Sedley (1998: 126–127).
61  Vlastos (1973: 87 and n. 33; 90).
62  Annas (1982: 318).
63  Fine (2003: 361).
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they are going to come into being, and on the other, that Forms must be considered by 
us as not active at all if we are going to preserve them in their pure ontological status of 
Forms. D. Sedley refers to the “transmission theory of causation” and describes different 
applications of it. He first explains by providing examples how, according to this theory, 
the agent transmits a property to the act or his character to his behaviour or a state or 
disposition to other persons. He then makes a very useful comment in which he stresses 
that we must be careful because, “to insist too strongly on transmission as a distinct stage 
in the causal process threatens to dilute the immediacy and transparency of the cause-
effect relation”. Furthermore, he adds that this is the reason why Plato does not include 
in the irreducible kernel of a causal statement the process by which the cause acts.64 This 
interpretation explains why the mode of transmission of the F-ness is no more important 
to the causal account of the relation between a Form F and the particulars, since what 
matters is to understand that the central ontological feature of Forms is that they lack 
activity and motion; henceforth presence of the Forms in the particulars or commu-
nion of the latter in the former can only be realized by participation. Nevertheless, in my 
view, it is obvious that Aristotle lays emphasis on this stage of the direct transmission of 
a property from the agent to the patient. The former is active in producing the change 
for as long as the patient is subject to its activity and passive in suffering the change.65 
Therefore, he believes that no change or motion can be explained without acceptance of 
the operation of this principle, which initiates the process of change and its cessation and 
constitutes what in Aristotelian terms is called, “the proximate efficient cause”. 
We have referred to the first Aristotelian argument, formulated in passage 335b18–20, 
which disputes that Forms are causes, because they do not generate things continuously, 
while both the Forms and the things which partake in them are always there. I believe 
that a Platonist could claim that this argument is invalid, because while Forms are always 
there, the things which partake in them are not always there, since they are sensibles. 
In addition to this counter-argument, from the Platonic standpoint, the question as to 
whether the Forms are the sole aitiai of coming and ceasing to be, could be easily rever-
sed so that instead it becomes whether the Aristotelian efficient causes are the sole and 
sufficient aitiai of generation and destruction or are co-causes, i.e. contributory causes 
(sun-aitia). In my view, with regard to the second Aristotelian argument, formulated 
in passage 335b20–24, a Platonist could raise the objection that the doctor, although 
somehow necessary, is not a sufficient efficient cause, because he cannot be in the posi-
tion to induce health, unless health comes into existence by participation in the Form of 
health. The doctor’s activity within the frame of the Platonic theory of Forms, considered 
as causal theory, would be construed as a contributory cause. This could be verified in 
64  Sedley (1998: 123–124). According to this interpretation, how a quality was transmitted, “is no more 
important to a causal account than it was at Phaedo 100d3–e3 to establish whether it is by sharing, presence or 
whatever that the Beautiful comes to make things beautiful” (Sedley 1998: 124).
65  See Arist. Ph. 202a3–9; 251b1–5; Annas (1982: 319–320). 
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the case of a doctor who is mistaken with regard to the treatment of a disease, when he 
erroneously advises medicines or a course of therapy of an ill situation. According to this 
view, only participation in the Form of health can guarantee the health of a particular 
sensible, in this case of a human being. This means that the only safe causal explanation, 
the only proper said efficient cause, is participation in the Form.66 
5. Philoponus on the defence of the Platonic theory of the Forms as Causes
Apart from these two objections which according to my reading could be raised by the 
Platonists, Philoponus in his comment on passage 335b9–16 presents what some thin-
kers say in defence of Plato, by invoking the notion of creative Forms (dēmiourgika eidē). 
According to Philoponus’ testimony,67 some say in defence of Plato that Plato stated that 
creative Forms are efficient causes, by participation in which things coming to be come 
to be and by the loss of which they perish. Philoponus adds that if Plato posits creative 
Forms, it is clear that he himself regards these as the efficient cause of the forms that are in 
generable things; he justifies this opinion by asserting that, in his view, the one who says 
c῾reative causes᾿  immediately leads into the concept of efficient causes. He then offers the 
following interpretation of Aristotle’s criticism of the Platonic Forms as causes: “someone 
might perhaps say that Aristotle reproaches Plato for this very reason, namely, that he 
says that Forms themselves produce, assigning no causal rôle to the Maker who looks at 
the Forms and in accordance with likeness to them produces things here”. We can under-
stand that the crucial point of this defence of Plato, which certainly is of Neoplatonic 
origin, is that it distinguishes between three kinds of forms: a) the separate and proper 
or strictly said Forms b) the creative Forms, and c) the forms that are in generable things. 
Only the creative Forms, i.e. the creative Ideas or the creative reasons (dēmiourgikoi logoi), 
are acknowledged as efficient causes; these are inherent in the Demiurge, understood 
as divine Intellect. We can see that this approach of the Platonic causal theory speaks of 
creative causes instead of efficient causes. This interpretation also recognizes the creative 
role of the Demiurge, which “consists in eternal contemplation of its inherent creative 
ideas, dēmiourgikoi logoi”.68 
At the level of the demiurgic and divine Intellect, the creation of the material world 
is the product of the creative Intellect’s reflection on itself; the divine Intellect eternal-
ly contemplates itself because the creative Ideas (dēmiourgikoi logoi) are immanent in 
66  See again Pl. Phd. 100c–101d. Ross (1951: 29–30) notes that the criticism which Socrates had passed 
on current accounts of causality in the Phaedo was that the cause named was not coextensive with the effect; 
according to the causal theory presented by Socrates in the same dialogue, formal causes alone are coextensive 
with their effects.
67  Philop. 286.1–10. 
68  See Kupreeva (2005: 141, n. 290). 
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it, and in this way divine causality is construed as a self-sufficient self-consciousness.69 
Asclepius, in his Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics,70 explains that the Demiurge 
creates by contemplating the creative ideas, i.e. the creative reasons (dēmiourgikoi logoi), 
which are immanent in him. He also explains nature’s creativity in an analogous way, 
while drawing a further analogy between the way that the Demiurge creates and the 
doctor cures, i.e. creates health. As the Demiurge, i.e. the divine Intellect, contemplates 
the creative reasons or ideas (dēmiourgikoi logoi) which are immanent in it, so the doctor 
induces health by contemplating the logous (reasons) of health which reside in its soul.
 This interpretation contributes in two ways to the solution of the problem which 
emerges when the Platonic Forms are considered as efficient causes without having 
an activity. Firstly, it recognizes the creative role of the Demiurge which is the proper 
said efficient cause, since it has actuality and activity. Secondly, it accepts two different 
ontological levels of Forms, the Forms which are separate and from without and the 
Forms which are immanent and can be immediately used as paradeigmata. In this way 
the need for direct influence of the transcendent Forms on the sensible and generable 
forms and the immediate relation between them is avoided since, as Kupreeva notes, the 
dēmiourgikoi logoi “act as efficient causes of sensible things, which participate in them”.71 
In fact, if we wish to be precise, it is better to say that the role of the efficient cause is 
assigned to the dēmiourgikoi logoi, the creative reasons or ideas, which do not act in the 
literal meaning of the word, but operate as efficient causes insofar as they are used as 
paradigms (paradeigmata). The sensible things participate in them and in this way come 
to be or loose participation in them and in this way cease to be. We can assume that the 
dēmiourgikoi logoi are contributory efficient causes since they are complementary to the 
Demiurge’s creative activity, which is the primary and proper said efficient cause.72 But 
the deficiency of this interpretation is that it duplicates the paradigmatic causes since, 
according to Plato, the transcendent Forms are the original prototypes, i.e. the primary 
paradigmatic causes.73
Philoponus explains that the crucial point of Aristotle’s criticism of the Platonic 
Forms as causes in passage 335b18–24, is centered on the demand of a reference to the 
Demiurge. According to his reading, it is most probable that Aristotle reproaches Plato 
for this very reason, namely because he does not assign any causal role to the Demiurge 
and in parallel claims that Forms themselves produce. Philoponus’ explanation at this 
point seems to construe Aristotle’s criticism of the Platonic Forms as causes in the Phae-
69  See Verrycken (1990: 209–210).
70  Ascl. In Metaph. 88.2–10.
71  See Kupreeva (2005: 141, n. 290).
72  Following this interpretative line we can draw a parallel between the Platonic Demiurge and the Aristo-
telian prime unmoved mover since both are separate and distinct causes, i.e. efficient causes in the strict sense. 
See again Alex. apud Simpl. In Phys. 317.27–28 (note 38 above).
73  See again Pl. Phd. 100c–101d and Philop. In Phys. 5.7–16.
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do from the Platonic view of causality, as presented in the Timaeus, where the Demiurge 
looks at the Forms and in accordance with likeness to them produces things here.74 In his 
comment on passage 335b7, Philoponus75 gives a different explanation, because here he 
says that Aristotle’s criticism is that Plato turned out to be unable to give the proximate 
efficient cause of things that come to be, but has had recourse to the Ideas. It is important 
to note on which point of Aristotle’s criticism one places the emphasis, in order to under-
stand if the explanation of this criticism is in a way that is consistent with the Aristotelian 
point of view or influenced by the Platonic and Neoplatonic perspective. If the emphasis 
is on the Maker or the Demiurge who looks at the Forms and in accordance with likeness 
to them produces things here, then it is obvious that the explanation of Aristotle’s critici-
sm is influenced by the Platonic and Neoplatonic view of the Forms considered as para-
deigmata. Within this frame of thought the Maker or the Demiurge, divine or human 
craftsman, first looks at the Forms which are immanent in his Intellect, and then acts 
and creates and produces whatever produces.76 If the emphasis is on the point that Plato 
fails to give the proximate efficient cause, then this explanation of Aristotle’ s criticism 
is consistent with what Aristotle says in book Lambda (1071b14–17) of his Metaphysics. 
Consequently, it shows that what is most important from the Aristotelian point of view is 
that the Platonic Forms are deficient in actuality and activity, so they cannot be efficient 
causes, i.e. they cannot be the causal answers or explanations to the question as to why 
things come to be and perish. 
In addition, it is obvious that Philoponus, by using the phrase “and for that reason” 
(286.10), which refers to what was said previously in passage 286,7–10, explains also the 
arguments which articulate Aristotle’s criticism of the Platonic Forms as causes under 
the Platonic point of view, i.e. by putting emphasis on the contemplation of the Forms 
by the intellect of the human person, either the doctor or the knowledgeable, who acts 
as efficient cause. Nevertheless, the way in which Philoponus paraphrases the Aristo-
telian arguments makes clear that what Aristotle says, is that the Forms or the rational 
principles of health and knowledge on the one hand, and the things receptive of health 
and knowledge on the other, are insufficient to explain why change occurs. There is still 
the need for some other efficient cause to act, because neither are the Forms sufficient in 
themselves to produce change, since they do not act, nor are their receptives sufficient 
to be subject to change by themselves, since they are passive. The proof of this need for 
a third principle which will be efficient by acting, is the fact that change is always inter-
mittent. So Aristotle postulates the activity of the efficient cause. 
74  Pl. Ti. 27d–29d. 
75  Philop. 285.19–21.
76  On the difference between the Platonic and the Aristotelian conception of paradeigma see Simpl. In Phys. 
310.23–24 and 314.15–19; Alex. apud Simpl. In Phys. 310.25–311.37.
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6. Criticism of the theories which explained generation and destruction by the 
material cause or the instrumental causes 
In passage 335b24–35, Aristotle also reproaches those who tried to explain generation 
and destruction by the material cause, i.e. as effects of the movement originating in the 
matter.77 Although he recognizes that to assign to the matter the causal role in the process 
of generation and destruction of things would be more in accordance with the study of 
nature78 than considering the Forms as efficient causes, he points out that this is also 
incorrect. The reason why this account is more in accordance with the study of nature is 
that the factor which alters a thing, or changes its shape, is more truly the cause of genera-
tion. Also, we are more generally accustomed to describe as the producer or the efficient 
cause, both in the case of things which occur in nature and of those which result from 
skill, that thing which has to do with affections and movement, since we call “efficient 
cause” the starting point of movement.79 In this respect, those who explain generation 
and destruction by the material cause deserve more approval than those who make the 
immobile Forms efficient causes. But they deserve criticism insofar as they did not name 
anything else as the cause of movement in matter; which proves that they were unawa-
re of the fact that matter does not have movement from itself.80 The same point about 
matter being incapable of having movement from itself has also been stressed by Philo-
ponus in his explanation of the Aristotelian passage 335a30–32.81 Philoponus highlights 
that matter obviously does not have the principle of producing and moving, but rather of 
being moved and being acted upon by another.82 Aristotle clarifies in passage 335b29–32 
that it is the property of matter to be acted upon and to be moved, whereas causing move-
77  Joachim (1922: 248). Joachim supposes that Aristotle alludes to the theories of the Atomists, the Pytha-
goreans, and Empedocles.
78  I follow the translation of Philop. 282.6–7 by Kupreeva, because I think it fits better with Aristotle’s word 
“φυσικώτερον” (335b25) than Williams’ translation (1982; repr. 2002: 53): “what he said would be more scientific 
than that just described”; cf. also the translation of Philop. 286.28–287.2 by Kupreeva.
79  Partly I follow the translation by Williams (1982; repr. 2002: 53) and partly the translation of the passage 
Philop. 282.5–7 by Kupreeva. Philoponus explains the argument of those who posited the matter as efficient 
cause by saying that their claim is that it produces because of its being changed (trepomenēn poiein); and he adds 
that those who posited indivisible principles, i.e. atoms, were also of this view; see Philop. 282.2–4. T. Irwin 
(1988: 96) maintains that Aristotle’s doctrine of four causes does not describe four objectively different causes, 
but only four ways to describe the cause, and three of these ways are mere abbreviations of the fourth way. We 
are acquainted with the common Aristotelian assumption about the concurrence between the efficient, the 
formal and the final cause. Irwin stresses another aspect of the Aristotelian theory of causes, namely the relation 
of the efficient cause with the material on the one hand, and on the other with the formal cause: “But if Aristotle 
cannot defend his claim as it stands, that the formal and material causes are different types of causes from the 
efficient cause, he can still reasonably argue that they are different types of efficient cause, differing from each 
other, though not from all types of efficient cause.” 
80  See Philop. 282.7–10 and 287.2–3. 
81  See Philop. 283.27–284.7.
82  See Philop. 282.10–11.
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ment and acting belongs to another capacity, something which is obvious both in the case 
of things which come to be through skill and things which come to be through nature.83
In passage 335b34–35, Aristotle reproaches those who explain generation and destruc-
tion by the material cause, by noting that they leave aside what is more strictly the cause, 
i.e. the essence and the form. We can reach the conclusion that in this way Aristotle aims 
to show that the formal cause is of no less importance than the others and in any case 
cannot be omitted. In my opinion, in this way he may also have wished to avoid creating 
the impression that by criticizing Plato’s view of Forms as efficient causes, he intended to 
eliminate the causal value or the causal role of the formal cause. Philoponus84 proceeds 
by reading and presenting this argument in three alternative ways, which show the affi-
nities of the formal cause on the one hand with the efficient, and on the other with the 
final cause. He offers three possible interpretations of this passage, one of which is attri-
buted by him to Alexander: a) Either Aristotle reproaches them for leaving aside form as 
well as the efficient cause b) or he is calling efficient cause form and shape, as Alexander 
says, because that which is producing produces while being in actuality, and that which 
is in actuality is such in accordance with form and shape; for each thing has its being in 
accordance with form, c) Philoponus believes it is more plausible to say that Aristotle is 
referring to the final cause, which they destroy by making material cause responsible for 
coming to be. According to Philoponus, in this way they assume that neither intellect nor 
nature preconceives the end, but that the things that come to be do so incidentally. At this 
point, we can note that while Alexander’s interpretation is oriented towards the Aristo-
telian thesis of the concurrence between the efficient and the formal cause, Philoponus 
follows a line of reasoning which could be characterized as “Platonic”, since it is based on 
the assumption that is not only intellect but also nature which preconceives the end. Such 
an approach is incompatible with the Aristotelian view, where as testified by Alexander, 
nature is an irrational power which does not work by choice or by any reason within it.85
In passage 336a1–6, Aristotle formulates a further argument against those who posi-
ted matter as the cause of generation, stating that the capacities or the powers they attri-
bute to the bodies, in virtue of which they make things come to be, are too instrumental 
causes of generation, and so in this way they eliminate the formal cause.86 According to 
Philoponus,87 when Aristotle says, “the cause in accordance with form”, he clearly means 
“form” here as efficient cause. Philoponus states that he aligns himself with those who 
agree that each of the things that come to be by nature has these powers as underlying 
the moving cause. But he also calls for a distinction between that which, using these as 
83  Transl. Williams (1982; repr. 2002: 53).
84  Philop. 287.8–15.
85  See again Simpl. In Phys. 310.23–24 and 314.15–19; Alex. apud Simpl. In Phys. 310.25–311.37. 
86  In general outline I follow the translation by Williams (1982; repr. 2002: 53). Philoponus testifies that 
according to Alexander those around Parmenides have been of this view; Philop. 287.25–26.
87  Philop. 287.20–25.
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an instrument, is the real, i.e. the strictly said, cause of coming to be and passing away, 
and these powers which operate only as instrumental causes. So, according to Philopo-
nus, Aristotle in this way underlines again the need for the recognition of the crucial role 
which the efficient cause plays in any account of generation and change in the realm of 
nature. 
In conclusion, Aristotle in De Generatione et Corruptione II 9 intends to establish 
the need for an investigation of the efficient cause. In order to show the necessity of this 
investigation he points out that a complete causal account of a natural or technical chan-
ge must definitely include not only the material and the formal cause, the latter being in 
concurrence with the final cause, but also the efficient cause. He also stresses that the 
efficient cause must not be confused with the formal cause and the material cause, so he 
divides his criticism in two categories: a) against those who believed that the nature of 
Forms is a sufficient efficient cause of all things which come to be and perish; those were 
the Platonists b) against those who tried to explain the generation and destruction of 
things by the material cause or the instrumental causes. Aristotle shows that the reason 
for the failure of all these theories to trace the real causes of coming to be, was the absen-
ce or lack of a clear recognition of the efficient cause.
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Aristotle’s Criticism of the Platonic Forms as Causes in De Genera-
tione et Corruptione II 9. A Reading Based on Philoponus’ Exegesis
In the De Generatione et Corruptione II 9, Aristotle aims to achieve the 
confirmation of his theory of the necessity of the efficient cause. In this 
chapter he sets out his criticism on the one hand of those who wrongly 
attributed the efficient cause to other kinds of causality and on the other, 
of those who ignored the efficient cause. More specifically Aristotle 
divides all preceding theories which attempted to explain generation 
and corruption into two groups: i) those which offered an explanation 
by using the formal cause ii) those which provided an explanation by 
using the material or the instrumental causes. According to Philopo-
nus, when Aristotle reproaches the other philosophers for adducing no 
proper notion of the efficient cause he alludes to both Anaxagoras and 
Plato. Regarding Anaxagoras, in our view this cannot be confirmed by 
internal textual evidence. In terms of Plato, in this chapter we trace an 
explicit and an implicit criticism of the Platonic Forms as causes. Aris-
totle’s implicit criticism is that the Forms are not at all active causes. We 
can understand better the grounds for this criticism if we also consider 
his relevant arguments in Book Lambda of his Metaphysics. His explicit 
criticism, articulated in two arguments, is formulated in GC 335b18–24. 
We examine the different lines of its interpretation in the second-
ary literature, but primarily we focus on Philoponus’ exegesis, which 
contributes significantly, not only to the clarification of Aristotle’s think-
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ing, but also to the manifestation of the arguments articulated in defence 
of the Platonic theory of the Forms. In this paper, through the analysis of 
Philoponus’ exegesis we set out to prove that Aristotle’s criticism of the 
Platonic causes can be construed from the perspective of either Aristo-
telian theory or the Platonic and Neoplatonic influence. Finally, based 
on Philoponus’ exegesis, we examine Aristotle’s criticism of those who 
posited matter or instrumental causes as efficient causes.
Aristotle, Plato, De Generatione et Corruptione, Phaedo, criticism, Forms, 
causes, efficient cause
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